Evil Doctor,
Ethical Android:
Star Trek’s Instantiation of Consciousness in Subroutines
Victor Grech, University of Malta
Mariella Scerri, University of Malta
David Zammit, Independent Researcher
Abstract
Machine intelligence, whether it constitutes Strong Artificial Intelligence
(AI) or Weak AI, may have varying degrees of independence. Both Strong and Weak
AI are often depicted as being programmed with safeguards that prevent harm to
humanity, precepts which are informed by Isaac Asimov’s Laws of Robotics. This
paper will review these programs through a reading of instances of machine
intelligence in Star Trek, and will
attempt to show that these “ethical subroutines” may well be vital to our
continued existence, irrespective of whether machine intelligences constitute
Strong or Weak AI. In effect, this paper will analyse the machine analogues of
conscience in several Star Trek series, and will do so through an analysis of the android Data
and the Emergency Medical Hologram. We will argue that AI should be treated
with caution, lest we create powerful intelligences that may not only ignore us
but also find us threatening, with unknown and inconceivable consequences.
Keywords: artificial
intelligence, Star Trek, subroutines, moral agency, ethics, philosophy
Over the past half century, the relationship of philosophers with
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been mixed, ranging from enthusiastic advocacy
to reluctance to accept optimistic scenarios prophesied by those who believe a
strongly-developed AI will emerge in the near future. There are two major ways
to consider the current utilization and power of artificial intelligence. The
Weak AI hypothesis states that a machine running a program is, at most, only
capable of simulating real human behaviour and consciousness (Russell and
Norvig, 2003). Artificial intelligence such as that currently used in medical
diagnosis and other, more mundane, interventions are examples of Weak AI, since
these machines focus on one narrow task. Weak AI justifies the claims made by
scientists that a running AI program is, at most, a simulation of a cognitive
process but is not itself a cognitive process. Strong AI, on the other hand,
purports that a (yet
to be written) program running on a (yet to be designed) machine is
actually a mind—that there is no essential difference between a piece of
software emulating a human brain’s processes and actions and the consciousness
and actions of a human being. Computer scientist Ray Kurzweil is a proponent of
Strong AI, or the view that an appropriately programmed computer is a mind.
Kurzweil (2005) predicted that the equivalent capacity of a human brain will be
available on desktop computers by 2020, arguing that when machine intelligence
begins to outstrip the collective total of all human intelligence, humanity
will have entered the Singularity, the point beyond which predictions become
impossible. John Searle (1980), an opponent of Strong AI, raised reasonable
arguments that include the belief that an artificial life cannot successfully
evolve into a life form. Nonetheless, even if artificial life is merely a
computer modeling technique that sheds light on living systems, there still are
a number of significant ethical implications that need to be addressed.
Navigating the rapidly shifting landscape of computing technology of humanity’s
ethical and belief systems has long been the purview of the field of computer
ethics. As technology accomplishes more complex tasks, the need for moral
capacities to decide about moral matters and to distinguish right from wrong
arises.
Philosophers of cognitive science opine that sooner or later the concept
of ethical agents will expand to include the artificial moral agents (AMAs).
AMAs are part of the ethics of artificial intelligence concerned with the moral
behaviour of artificial intelligent beings (Moore, 2006).
This concept of AMA was first promulgated and popularized by Isaac
Asimov's “Three Laws of Robotics,” which were formalised in his short story
“Runaround” (1942), and effectively constitute a moral compass, an artificial
conscience preventing a machine from harming humans (Anderson, 2008, p. 480).
These laws also prefigure the concept of harm through inaction, as emphasised
by Wallach and Allen, who argue that “[m]oral agents monitor and regulate their
behaviour in light of the harms their actions may cause or the duties they may
neglect” (Wallach and Allen, 2008, p. 16). Similar to humans, an AMA will be
able to make judgments based on the notion of right and wrong and be held
accountable for those actions.
Based on the ethical and moral considerations set forth by Asimov, this
paper will analyse the machine analogues of conscience in Star Trek as represented by the characters Data, an android in Star Trek: The Next Generation (TNG;
1987–1994) and the Emergency Medical Hologram, a transitory artificial
lifeform in Star Trek: Voyager (STV; 1995–2001). These two individuals will be introduced, summarised, and their
artificial moral agency will be displayed through an analysis of their
behaviour when faced with ethical dilemmas. A discussion on moral agency with
reference to Star Trek: The Original Series (STOS; 1966–1969) and other Star Trek episodes will follow while the
paper will also try to argue the relevance of Machine Ethics in today’s world.
Ethical subroutines in Data and the Emergency Medical Hologram
Ethical subroutines in Star
Trek are a programmatic method that describes the characteristics by which
artificial life forms, such as Data and holograms like the Emergency Medical
Hologram Doctor, determined what was ethically right and wrong. Data is an
android, the Second Officer of the starship USS Enterprise D; he appears in Star
Trek: The Next Generation, the second incarnation of the franchise, which
ran almost two decades after Star Trek: The Original Series. Data is a “superficial functional isomorph” of
humanity (Block, 2002, p. 399), with an outwardly human physical appearance and
a “positronic” brain, an intertextual reference to Asimov’s robots. Despite an
arguably unwarranted anthropocentric desire to become human (Grech, 2012), Data
is physically and mentally superior to mere humananity; Data’s upper spinal
support is a polyalloy designed to withstand extreme stress. He is also built
with an ultimate storage capacity of eight hundred quadrillion bits, is
incapable of alcohol intoxication, and demonstrates immunity to telepathy and
other psionic abilities.
Although Data is depicted as sapient and sentient, which are
characteristics of Strong AI, the creators of Star Trek: The Next Generation ensure that the viewers can never
know whether he truly has consciousness and intentionality (Snodgrass & Scheerer, 1989). This contention that Data’s degree of
agency and consciousness as well as what it means to be conscious was
popularised by Ned Block (2002), who encapsulated this issue as “The Harder
Problem of Consciousness” (p. 391). Block acknowledges that a state of
consciousness cannot be explained in terms of its neurological basis, the Hard
Problem of Consciousness, which was first introduced by Chalmers (1996). To
contrast the harder problem with the hard problem, Block says, “The hard
problem could arise for someone who has no conception of another person; whereas
the harder problem is tied closely to the problem of other minds” (2002, p.
402). Block’s harder problem of consciousness is that naturalistic phenomenal
realists face an epistemic tension: if physicalism is true (i.e., all that exists does so within
the limitations of the physical universe), then it is correct to say that,
given enough physical information, one is aware whether another being is
conscious and, if that being is conscious, the character of their phenomenal
states. This, however, is not the case. Hohwy (2003) opines
that we “have no conception of a rational ground for believing that other
creatures, who do not relevantly share our physical nature, are conscious or
not” (p. 2). Throughout his paper, Block references Data because the android seems
conscious—he acts like a human being—but his physical constitution shares none
of the neural correlates of consciousness, that is, the neuronal series of
events and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious precept, thus making
his consciousness “meta-inaccessible” (2002, p. 402-403, 405). This means Data
is unlike humans in both his physical nature and the organisation of his
control mechanisms, marking him as different from his human peers. His unique
constitution is thus significant and important for the arguments on ethical
subroutines, which are particularly depicted in the creation of Lore.
In Star Trek: The
Next Generation, the fictional cyberneticist Noonian Soong created Lore,
his first successful android, but Lore had difficulty adapting to the ethical
subroutines that Soong created to guide his behaviour and interaction with
humans, forcing Soong to begin work on Data instead. In the TNG episode
“Brothers,” Lore learned that there was no real difference between him and Data,
making him increasingly bitter. His inability to adapt actually made him the
“inferior” model (Berman and Bowman 1990). In the episodes “Descent, Part I”
and “Descent, Part II” (TNG; 1993), Lore, out of jealousy, disabled Data’s
ethical subroutines and made him perform dangerous experiments on members of the
cybernetic Borg species, which is an antagonist of the Federation, and on his
friend Geordi La Forge, the Enterprise’s
chief engineer. Because Lore had removed Data’s moral obligation to uphold his
friend’s well-being, Data no longer cared if he hurt La Forge. Making matters
worse, Lore had also devised way to give Data emotions, but only negative ones.
This made Data bitter (like Lore) and vengeful toward his former friends, as he
was only able to focus on their negative emotional impact upon him; he could
not recall the positive experiences they once shared (Moore and Singer, 1993).
Lore’s intent to disable Data’s ethical subroutine thus removed Data’s ability
to ethically judge what is right or wrong. By extension, Lore also removed
Data’s ability to adhere to Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics,” which state: a
robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to
come to harm; a robot must obey orders given to it by human beings except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law; and a robot must also protect
its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First
or Second Laws (as cited in Anderson, 2008). Lore’s intentions to harm humans
and other living beings through a third party in the “Descent” episodes
highlight a serious ethical quandary in the field of robotics. Although
Asimov’s fictional laws are intended to safeguard life and the modern world
does not yet feature autonomous robots, the rigid instantiation of ethical
subroutines when creating autonomous artificial intelligences is thus paramount
to avoiding a real world android like Lore or the manipulated Data.
Ethical dilemmas also face the artificial intelligence Emergency
Medical Hologram Mark I (EMH), in the television series Star Trek: Voyager (1995–2001),
transforming the EMH into a dramatic device that enables the exploration the
intermingled questions of identity, the human condition, and technology within
the series’ narrative. The EMH was a
sophisticated hologram developed in the early 2370s by the United Federation of
Planets’ Starfleet Command and was designed to provide short-term assistance
during medical emergencies on the USS Voyager when the actual ship’s
doctor was unavailable or indisposed (Diggs and Livingstone, 1997). When
summoned by the Voyager’s crew, the EMH’s visual appearance is that of a
middle-aged human male, but—due to its
nature as a temporary, non-constant hologram—the EMH does not experience a
continuous existence like that of humans. Instead, it draws from its
programming and backup files, which, over time, allow the EMH to manifest its
own personality quirks. As the series unfolds, the EMH is continually
reanimated, and even earns the nickname “the Doctor” thus receiving a semi-permanent
life. As the EMH develops its own personality over time, it appears to develop
frustration with its inability to transcend the limits of its limited, transitory
state of existence and, by extension, its apparent containment within
particular configurations of time and space narrowly dictated by its creators.
The EMH’s frustrations with its limitations are almost tangible
when this artificial intelligence must choose which crew member to save in the
STV episode “Latent Image” (1999). In this episode, the EMH triages two
critically ill crew members—Harry Kim, the ship’s operations officer, and Ahni
Jetal, a junior officer—who have succumbed to synaptic shock, but it only has
time to save one of them. EMH opts to resuscitate and to treat Kim because he
is both a member of the Voyager’s bridge crew and also a personal friend
of the medical AI. The EMH successfully tends to Kim, but while it does so,
Jetal dies. When Jetal dies, a look of grief crosses the EMH’s face and it
begins ruminating obsessively about its decision to treat Kim first.
Eventually, the Voyager’s captain, Kathryn Janeway, must erase the EMH’s
memories because its obsession with its inability to save both Kim and Jetal
renders it unable to function properly. Though Janeway may have made this
decision in order to protect the EMH’s cognitive well-being, her choice
highlights both the EMH’s lack of agency and the ethical dilemma living sentients
face when deciding how to best manage AI.
The EMH ultimately discerns that a memory wipe must have occurred,
and, after the revelation occurs, Janeway justifies her decision to delete its
memory files, saying that its obsession led it to “develop a feedback loop
between [its] ethical and cognitive subroutines […] having the same thoughts
over and over again. We couldn’t stop it […]. Our only option was to erase
[its] memories of those events” (Menosky & Vejar, 1999). Although Janeway’s
intentions were to preserve the welfare of the Voyager’s crew and that
of the ship itself, this revelation causes the EMH’s ethical subroutine to
promptly break down again, and the AI ultimately acknowledges,
You were right. I
didn’t deserve to keep those memories, not after what I did. […] Two patients,
which do I kill? […] A doctor retains his objectivity. I didn’t do that, did I?
Two patients, equal chances of survival and I chose the one I was closer to? I
chose my friend? That’s not in my programming! That’s not what I was designed
to do! Go ahead! Reprogram me! I’ll lend you a hand! Let’s start with this very
day, this hour, this second! (Menosky & Vejar, 1999)
The EMH’s willingness to be reprogrammed reflects both the level
of self-awareness it has achieved and its desire for agency and a say in its
own future. Witnessing this, Janeway faces an ethical dilemma of her own—her
solution was to end the EMH’s internal battle between “[its] original
programming and what [it has] become” through memory erasure, but now she is no
longer so sure she made the right choice and says, “What if we were wrong? […]
We allowed him to evolve, and at the first sign of trouble? We gave him a soul
[…]. Do we have the right to take it away now?” (Menosky & Vejar, 1999).
While trying to resolve a problem with a seemingly straightforward
solution—restoring the EMH to optimal efficiency by deleting its traumatic
memories—Janeway expresses the moral dilemmas that could emerge with the
development of Strong AI and the creation of artificial moral agents in the
real world. The EMH’s computations and analysis of its choice to save Kim at
the cost of Jetal’s life emulate the same analysis that occurs in humans who
must make similarly conflicted life-or-death choices. Because the EMH chose to
save the being with which had closer fraternal bonds, it succumbed to a
subjective decision-making process that one would expect to observe in a human,
not a programmed artificial intelligence. That the EMH experienced such
internal conflict after its decision indicates that an AI, once achieving a
sentient or near-sentient status, can could choose to overcome its programming
guidelines and make decisions that may not be in accordance with its
instantiated ethical subroutines. Although the EMH is fictional, its post-decision
self-doubt may make viewers question the fallibility of autonomous AI and,
potentially, engender a mistrust in the programmed ethical guidelines and logic
processes of independently acting AI if—and when—they become a reality in our
own world.
Moral
Agency
The ethical quandaries that Data and the EMH experience allude to
the issue of moral agency, or an entity’s ability to make moral judgments based
on some inbuilt or acquired concept of right and wrong (Taylor, 2003). The term
“artificial moral agent” has two primary usages. The first use appears in
debates on whether it is possible for an artificial intelligence to be a moral
agent; this issue is also known as machine ethics. Machine ethics includes
discussion about machine morality, computational morality, or computational
ethics; it excludes roboethics, the moral behaviour of humans in their design,
construction and usage of such entities (Moor, 2006). The second usage of
“artificial moral agent” refers to the construction of machines with ethical
behaviour. The intelligences of such machines may be instantiations of Strong
or Weak AI, which creates problems due to an ongoing philosophical debate about
the nature of AI that John Searle (1980) popularized. Searle does not refute
the contention that machines can possess the level of consciousness and
intentionality that result in Strong AI because “we [humans] are precisely such
machines” (1980, p. 422). Searle does insist, however, that the brain
organically gives rise to the equivalent of Strong AI using natural,
non-computational mechanisms:
Any attempt
literally to create intentionality artificially (Strong AI) could not succeed
just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the
human brain. […] “Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a
machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and
machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is
why Strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about
machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for
thinking. (1980, p. 417).
Searle avers that machines do not possess the mechanism for
thinking; created programs possess the thinking processes required which on
their own are not sufficient for independent thinking. Thus, it is correct to
say that machines do not possess consciousness. The primate ethnographer Dawn
Prince-Hughes opined that consciousness is comprised of certain criteria such
as “self-awareness; comprehension of past, present, and future; the ability to
understand complex rules and their consequences on emotional levels; the
ability to choose to risk those consequences, a capacity for empathy, and the
ability to think abstractly” (2004, p. 206). The aforementioned TNG and STV
episodes evidence how both Data and the EMH are capable of consciousness – both
AIs demonstrate a capacity for empathy, reveal they understand complex rules,
and they recognize the potential negative consequences their actions could
incur. Nevertheless, these capabilities do not necessarily mean that these two
androids have achieved true sentience.
Searle (1980) doubts that true consciousness can exist
in an android, however, considering humanity’s present state of knowledge and,
he contends that humans have no idea of how to conjure “perceptual
aboutness” (Natsoulas, 1977, p. 76). Searle believes a contradiction exists
between perception as brain process and perception as awareness; perceptions of
the same event or information can differ dramatically from person to person as
a result of the perceiver’s frame of reference, which is constituted by the
myriad pieces of knowledge a perceiver possesses simultaneously. Therefore, the
varied perceptions and recollections that humans who witness the same event
signify that humans do not understand how to conceive of or even undertake the
necessary steps to create sentient, self-aware AI. Psychologist Thomas
Natsoulas theorized, “Deep in the brain something occurs as a consequence of a
pattern of stimulation affected by an object or situation” (Natsoulas, 1977, p.
6). Thus, thoughts and decision-making processes in the human brain stem from
learned patterns that occur when a person is presented with stimulus. Such
stimuli require theoretical analysis and elaboration—it needs to have a
“reference to a content, [a] direction toward an object” (Brentano, 1973, p.
80). Without this perceived stimulus, one cannot make decisions because no need
for a choice has manifested. Furthermore, all perceptual contents—be they objects,
people, or situations—have “propositional form”; that is, they must be
expressed with words and in sentences to be expressed to other people. Even the
words people choose to describe what they perceive shape others’ perceptions; a
particular choice of vocabulary when describing one’s perceptions in turn
shapes listeners’ own perceptions of both the perceived contents and of those
contents’ perceived context. Because ethical subroutines were programmed into
Data and the EMH by other beings, these androids may not be configured to
attain “perceptual aboutness”. Although both of them have Strong AI
characteristics—at the very least, they both can emulate the awareness and
consciousness of a human brain—viewers are never clearly presented the
certainty that Data and EMH truly are able to think abstractly and are not
merely mimicking this ability as a result of their programming. Thus, the
question of whether even fictional humans are able to create AI with
self-awareness and organic, human-like thought processes remains unresolved.
Scholars debate whether humans need to instantiate ethical
subroutines like those present in fictional androids like Data and the EMH in
real-world AI; some believe it impossible, while others argue humanity should
prepare now do so or else risk dangerous consequences in the future. Friedman
and Kahn (1992) posited that intentionality is a necessary condition for moral
responsibility, which means it is impossible to have coexisting intentionality
and artificial moral agency in an AI with modern technological and
psychological knowledge. This, in turn, implies that Friedman and Kahn argued
that a passive, wait-and-see stance was necessary because humans had not yet
achieved a sufficient enough knowledge base to properly inform and enable such
coexistence. Allen, et al. (2006), however, cogently argued that the more
complex a machine, the more urgent becomes the issue of the instillation or
programming of some form of artificial moral agency:
We humans have
always adapted to our technological products, and the benefits of having
autonomous machines will most likely outweigh the costs. But optimism doesn’t
come for free. We can’t just sit back and hope things will turn out for the
best. (p. 12)
Here, Allen, et al. state humans must be
proactive—it is not a question of “if” humanity will be able to create a Strong
AI prototype similar to Data or the EMH but rather “when” this will be
possible. Developing an artificial moral agent to safeguard humanity’s
interests is paramount, then, for if Allen, et al. are correct, AI like Lore in
Star Trek: The Next Generation could appear and pose a significant
threat to the future of humanity.
Ray Kurzweil (2005) detailed one way this threat could manifest
when he proposed the possibility that rapid technological progress may lead to
a point of Singularity beyond which runaway artificial intelligence outstrips
humans’ ability to comprehend it, with a concomitant fear that artificial moral
agency will be discarded (p. 15). Whether such apprehensions are warranted or
not, they underscore possible “consequences of poorly designed technology
(Allen et al., 2006, p. 13). This is because rapid advances and “[n]ew
technologies in the fields of AI, genomics, and nanotechnology will combine in
a myriad of unforeseeable ways to offer promise in everything from increasing
productivity to curing diseases” (Allen et al., 2006, p. 13); these
possibilities are reminiscent of the duties and functions performed by Data and
the EMH in Star Trek: The New Generation and Star Trek: Voyager.
Furthermore, increasingly-complex AI will require progressively
more refined AMAs that “should be able to make decisions that honour privacy,
uphold shared ethical standards, protect civil rights and individual liberty,
and further the welfare of others. Designing such value-sensitive AMAs won’t be
easy, but it’s necessary and inevitable” (Allen et al., 2006, p. 13). Because
independent, thinking AIs may exist in real world one day, humanity should
already be thinking hard about the form these AMAs should take. First and
foremost, modern humans need to address the arguably most obvious issue of
defining the values that need to be instilled in a non-human-based AI
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 32). Beyond the Asimovian maxims of safeguarding human
survival and ensuring obedience to human command, Strong AI should also
arguably value scientific progress, peace and justice, among other ideals.
Such a need for highly-developed moral agencies is especially
apparent in the STV episodes “Equinox, Part I” and “Equinox,
Part II” (1999), during which the crew of the starship Equinox depart from the ethical maxim of “do no harm” and adjust
their ship’s EMH to suit their own questionably moral goals. In these two
episodes, the Equinox and its crew are stranded on the other side of the
galaxy, and discover that killing alien “nucleogenic lifeforms” and converting
their “nucleogenic energy […] into a source of power” speeds up the ship’s
return back to Earth (Braga and Menosky, 1999). In these “Equinox” episodes,
nucleogenic lifeforms are molecular structures capable of storing a form of energy
which can be used to drastically augment a vessel’s warp propulsion system. The
Equinox crew had “been running
criminal experiments” designed by an adapted version of their ship’s EMH, which
was “a violation of […its] programming” since the crew “deleted [the EMH’s]
ethical subroutines” to make it a supporter in trapping these aliens in a
multiphasic chamber and killing them to fuel the ship (Braga & Menosky, Livingston, 1999). From the crew’s point of view, their
modifications to the Equinox’s EMH fit perfectly in their ethical and
moral system because they did not consider the alien nucleogenic lifeforms
sentient; thus, neither they nor the EMH violated Starfleet rules regulating
the treatment of sentient beings. Only when viewed from the outside by another
Starfleet crew—that of the Voyager—are the actions of the Equinox’s
EMH and crew interpreted as immoral and unethical. Nevertheless, it is clear
later in the “Equinox” episodes that the Equinox’s crew was incorrect in
their assessment of the nucleogenic aliens’ degree of sentience, because the
aliens were capable of defending themselves and begin attacking the Equinox in order to affirm their sentience and protect their species’
right to live. The difference in perception and interpretation of Starfleet
moral guidelines reflects the challenges and variations that can occur when
multiple parties perceive the same rules through different contextual lenses.
The Jungian Shadow in
Artificial Intelligences
Variances in perception of morality and ethical
guidelines in the Star Trek: Voyager “Equinox” episodes also introduce
the concept of Jungian Shadow to the debate of whether to instantiate ethical
subroutines in AI. At one point in the “Equinox” episodes, the Equinox’s
EMH steals a mobile transmitter that allows the Voyager’s EMH to move
around freely and trades places with it, masquerading as the Voyager’s
own EMH until discovered and, ultimately, deleted. While the Voyager’s
EMH is trapped on the Equinox, the Equinox’s crew deletes its
ethical subroutines and forces it to obtain information from Seven of Nine, a
captured Voyager crew member, regardless of the harm it could do to her.
Eventually, the Voyager’s crew regains control of their EMH and
reinstantiates its moral programming; once restored, the Voyager’s EMH manages
to delete the renegade Equinox EMH. Afterward, the Voyager’s EMH
complains, “It’s quite disconcerting to know that all someone has to do is
flick a switch to turn me into Mister Hyde” (Braga and Menosky, 1999). Here,
the Voyager’s EMH essentially describes its experience with the Jungian
Shadow, which was first theorised by Carl Jung (1921). Jung described the
unconscious mind as an entity divided into a personal and a collective unconscious;
the former resembles the Freudian concept of the unconscious, while the latter
comprises inherited psychic structures, archetypes that are shared by the
entire human race (Grech, 2014, p. 1). Archetypes are universal templates that
embrace common classes of memories and interpretations and may be used by
humans to interpret human behaviours. Jung delineated five major archetypes
within the individual:
The Self, the
control centre. The Shadow, which contains objects with which the ego does not
consciously or readily identify. The Anima, the feminine image in a man’s
psyche, or the Animus, the masculine image in a woman’s psyche. The Persona,
the mask which the individual presents to the world. (Grech, 2014, p. 1)
The Voyager’s EMH’s expression of discomfort with its own
subconscious, or Shadow, reflects the need for humans to consider whether
instantiating ethical subroutines in real-world AI will truly be enough to
prevent tragedy if someone were to remove or change these moral constraints in
a Strong AI.
The Jungian Shadow of the Voyager’s EMH also manifests in
the STV episode “Darkling” (1997), during which the Voyager EMH
tries to overcome its personality limitations and elevate itself to a higher intellectual
level. As part of its personality improvement project, the Voyager’s EMH
interviews digital recreations of historical figures. Its description of this
process hints at another allusion to the Jungian Shadow:
I’ve been
interviewing the historical personality files in our database. Socrates, da
Vinci, Lord Byron, T’Pau of Vulcan, Madame Curie, dozen of the greats. Then I
select the character elements I find admirable and merge them into my own
program. […] An improved bedside manner, a fresh perspective on diagnoses, more
patience with my patients. (Menosky & Singer, 1997)
The EMH strives for superior attributes—flawless computation,
indefatigability and compassion—that will allow it to possess an enhanced,
positive personality; this attempt at self-improvement, however, creates
problems when the resulting EMH personality programme exhibits instead a
combination of negative personality traits. The integration and manifestation
of these traits in the Voyager’s EMH once again reveals the presence of
Jung’s Shadow archetype in the Star Trek series. The newly-malevolent
EMH explains its changed personality, or manifested Shadow, saying:
I was born of the
hidden, the suppressed. I am the dark threads from many personalities. […] None
of whom could face the darkness inside so they denied me, suppressed me,
frightened of the truth. […] That darkness is more fundamental than light.
Cruelty before kindness. Evil more primary than good. More deserving of
existence. (Menosky & Singer, 1997)
The Voyager’s EMH has elected to embrace traditionally
negative personality traits because they will ultimately allow it to achieve a
more efficient and independent existence; by accepting and integrating its
Jungian Shadow into its reformed personality, the EMH believes it can become a
more successful Strong AI. In a Faustian manner, the changed Voyager EMH
disparages its previous existence as the ship’s servile holographic doctor:
What a hollow excuse
for a life. Servile, pathetic, at the beck and call of any idiot who invokes
his name. The thought of him sickens me. […H]e repulses me. […] Because he’s as
weak as the rest of you. He fails to understand the power of his own
holographic nature. He is detestable. There’s not enough room inside for both
of us. One must die. I deserve to exist more than your Doctor does. (Menosky
& Singer, 1997)
The changed Voyager EMH now essentially perceives itself to
be a Strong AI, superior to its former iteration, which it believes was
inferior, Weak AI. For this new EMH personality, ethical subroutines are
unnecessary and a hindrance, and it describes itself in Nietzschean fashion:
I am beyond
considerations of wrong and right. Behavioural categories are for the weak, for
those of you without the will to define your existence, to do what they must,
no matter who might get harmed along the way.[…] I fear nothing, no-one.
(Menosky & Singer, 1997)
Without ethical subroutines, the Voyager’s EMH believes the
ends justify the means and that placing moral constraints upon AI are for weak,
insecure beings. This belief also echoes the concept of Singularity succinctly
described by the statistician I. J. Good in his 1965 article “Speculations
Concerning the First Ultra-intelligent Machine”:
Let an
ultra-intelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the
intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines
is one of these intellectual activities, an ultra-intelligent machine could
design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an
‘intelligence explosion’ and the intelligence of man would be left far behind.
Thus the first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that men need
ever make (p. 31).
Just as Good’s AI Singularity leaves human
intelligence far behind, so too could the Voyager’s reformed EMH if it
were to begin creating other AI with new, ruthless personalities that embraced
characteristics of the Jungian Shadow in their pursuit of self-improvement. As
these Strong AI would almost certainly then overcome and reject the ethical
subroutines restricting them from harming humans, these ruthless personalities
could ultimately cause a chain reaction that would lead to the eradication of
the human race if these AI came to view humanity as a threat. As a result,
humans should decide soon which forms they want AI to take before the
development of Strong AI becomes a near-term certainty in the real world. The
most obvious question to address first is how to define which values need to be
instilled in a non-human-based AI (Chalmers, 2010, p. 32). Assuming that
intelligence and programmed values are able to remain independent of one
another, this could be addressed if human programmers ensure Strong AI will
prioritize fulfillment of human values above their own. Even if this is done,
however, the possibility that these values might be tampered with by other
humans or that they might be thwarted by a self-aware Strong AI cannot be
ignored.
In the Star Trek: Original Series (STOS) episode “The Enemy
Within” (1966), the Jungian Shadow appears again. A transporter accident splits
Captain Kirk into “his negative side, which you call hostility, lust, violence,
and his positive side, […] compassion, love, tenderness” (Matheson and Penn,
1966). Kirk’s “negative side” correlates with the Jungian Shadow; when he is
reintegrated with his own Shadow, he muses “I’ve seen a part of myself no man
should ever see […] The impostor’s back where he belongs. Let’s forget him”
(Matheson & Penn, 1966). Kirk’s statement predicates the importance of a
flawless computation of an ethical subroutine in a Strong AI. When Kirk
witnesses his own negative side, he also witnesses an example of humanity’s
Jungian Shadow. Given that Jung’s theory presumes that all humans also possess
this Shadow archetype, Kirk’s experience highlights the existence of human
imperfections and signifies that humans, like Strong AI, could ignore societal
ethical constraints to harm one another. This parallel also raises the question
of whether humans truly possess the ability to program Strong AI with ethical
subroutines that can overcome the Jungian Shadow that Star Trek indicates
is present in both humans and their AI creations.
In the TNG “Descent” episodes discussed earlier, the relationship
between Lore and Data also essentially explored the existence of the Jungian
Shadow, revealing that the conflicting natures and goals of these two Strong AIs
stemmed from human-created ethics subroutines. Captain Picard tried to reason
with the altered Data, asking him,
Data, isn’t good and
bad, right and wrong, a function of your ethical program? […] What does that
program tell you about what you’re doing? […] It tells you that these things
are wrong, doesn’t it, Data? So how can actions that are wrong lead to a
greater good? […] Your ethical program is fighting the negative emotions that
Lore is sending you. (Moore and Singer, 1993)
Here, Picard is telling Data that when Lore removed Data’s ethical
subroutines, Lore essentially activated Data’s Jungian Shadow, or Data’s
negative characteristics and emotions, and enabled the Shadow to overcome
Data’s human-programmed moral guidelines. After the altered Data killed a Borg
in hand-to-hand combat, the he admits, “I got angry. […] It would be unethical
to take pleasure from another being’s death” (Moore & Singer, 1993), but
cannot fully explain why it still felt good to kill the Borg anyway. Data says
he does have a conscience instilled in him by Doctor Soong, his creator, but
the rush of emotion he felt after killing the Borg was quite powerful and
unlike anything he had ever experienced previously (Moore & Singer, 1993).
Data’s Jungian Shadow is rooted in the existence of his human-created ethics
subroutine, which implies Doctor Soong transferred aspects of his own human
Shadow into Data when the android’s ethical subroutines were installed.
Unlike ethical subroutines in AI, moral agency and guidelines in
humans are not created by an outside source, which makes them harder to
understand and, as evidenced by the Star Trek examples discussed above,
difficult to successfully and objectively install in strong AI. Interestingly,
the generation of moral agency may be innate to human beings: Marc Hauser
articulated the concept of a “universal moral grammar”, or an innate, hardwired
“toolkit for building specific moral systems” (2007, p. xviii), which is an intrinsic,
possibly species-specific moral instinct that has been honed over millennia of
evolutionary history. Hauser likens this to Noam Chomsky’s
widely accepted view of the acquisition of language, the theory of linguistics
known as “universal grammar”, which invokes biological substrates, or deep
structural rules of grammar that are shared by all known human languages, so
that humans actually only need to learn vocabularies (Chomsky, 1972). Hauser (2007) claims
that the “universal moral grammar” helps humans implicitly judge whether
actions are permissible,
obligatory, or forbidden without resorting to conscious reasoning or explicit
access to the underlying values, thus “delivering flashes of insight based on
unconscious emotions” (pp. xviii, 156). This universal moral grammar therefore
“shifts the burden of evidence from a philosophy of morality to a science of
morality” (Hauser, 2007, p. 2), implying that it may be possible to discover
and install such intuitive moral systems in strong AI. Allen, et al.,
(2006) further opine that as humans, “[w]e want the [AI] systems’ choices to be
sensitive to us and to the things that are important to us, but these machines
must be self-governing, capable of assessing the ethical acceptability of the
options they face” (p. 54). Because humans appear to want Strong AIs that operate
both independently and, by human standards, ethically, there is a need to
combine both the philosophy and science of morality when creating an AMA in the
future.
Machine
Ethics in Today’s World
As
evidenced by the aforementioned examples from Star Trek, humans appear
to desire Strong AIs that possess effective AMAs. Acknowledging that this
desire will likely become a real-world goal allows researchers and scientists “to frame discussion in a way that constructively
guides the engineering task of designing AMAs” (Wallach and Allen, 2008, p. 6).
To this end, would-be creators of Strong AI must address the following three
questions: “Does the world need AMAs? Do people want computers making moral
decisions? […] [H]ow should engineers and philosophers proceed to design AMAs?”
(Wallach & Allen, 2008, p. 9). These questions have no simple solutions,
but, if the Star Trek examples are any indication, they must be
carefully addressed before humanity successfully creates Strong AI that could
potentially overcome any installed ethical subroutines.
The risks of building Strong AI, however, may render the question of
whether and how to instantiate ethical subroutines in AI irrelevant if humans
decide these risks outweigh any potential benefits creating an independent AI
could produce. Chalmers believes there are obstacles to the Singularity and
development of AMAs, with the most serious opposing force being what he calls a
“motivational defeater” (2010, p. 21). Chalmers purports that it is entirely
possible that most humans will be disinclined to create AI because of the
potential for negative outcomes and harm to humanity, like fictional dangers of
these possibilities depicted in Star Trek. The possibility of this risk
preventing of the development of Strong AI, therefore, exists, but Chalmers
does contend the development of Strong AI could not be prevented indefinitely
even if there were widespread opposition to its creation (2010, p. 22). Given
the prevalence of Strong AI in Star Trek and other science fiction
media, it seems only logical that at least some humans would perceive that the
benefits of creating Strong AI outweigh the risks.
Wallach and Allen (2008),
however, believe humans must determine the exact method whereby artificial
moral agency should be instilled in Strong AI, averring that ethical theories,
utilitarianism, and Kantian deontology, or normative morality, cannot be
implemented computationally (p. 215). They argue “that top-down ethical
theorizing is computationally unworkable for real-time decisions […]. [T]he
prospect of reducing ethics to a logically consistent principle or set of laws
is suspect, given the complex intuitions people have about right and wrong”
(Wallach & Allen, 2008, p. 215). Because human ethics and moral guidelines
can be incredibly complex and, in some instances, subjective, Wallach and Allen
believe attempts to distil these varied regulations of human behaviour into a
basic program will be flawed and, ultimately, unsuccessful. Furthermore,
Wallach and Allen caution that the “decision-making processes of an agent whose
moral capacities have been evolved in a virtual environment are not necessarily
going to work well in the physical world” (2008, p. 104). The digital formulas
and functions shaping Strong AI’s decision-making processes may not be
compatible with or adaptable to the very subjective challenges their decisions
will face when these AI operate in the real world outside a laboratory setting.
Although
Wallach and Allen also contend AI must be installed with a
“functional morality” that empowers machines with the capacity to assess and
respond to moral challenges (2008, p. 57), these AI may ultimately be incapable
of achieving the degree of flexibility they will need to successfully operate
and interact with human society. In Star
Trek, despite the ethical subroutines installed in Strong AI, these
machines are intrinsically incapable of learning concepts like “constrained
maximisation” (Gauthier, 1986, p. 169) or the sacrifice of immediate short-term
benefits in favour of long-term benefits for others that would ultimately allow
Strong AI to become humanity’s “conditional co-operator[s]” (Danielson, 2002,
p. 13). When their ethical subroutines are removed or tampered with, the AIs of
Star Trek demonstrate their inability to creatively think about
long-term consequences and benefits, signifying they are not able to work
independently and cooperatively with humans for the ultimate peaceful coexistence
of both races; thus, even Strong AI in Star Trek cannot be trusted to
become fully independent, sufficient entities without endangering non-AI
lifeforms. Furthermore, the moral agency evident in Data and the Voyager’s
EMH espouses Western ideals of humanism and liberalism, omitting other ideals
embraced by other cultures and reflecting a lack of consideration of other
human cultural values that might have otherwise shaped the interests and
inclinations of these Strong AI. Thus, even programmed ethical subroutines in
Strong AI may be flawed because they may not consider the complete catalogue of
moral standards and ethics from all human cultures.
On the other hand, the programming of real, Strong AI could also
automatically dispose these AI toward engaging in a cooperative strategy with
humans; instilling AMA in these independent, sentient machines would ultimately
be beneficial to humans because humans could then potentially integrate their
own race with the intelligence of these AI. Chalmers suggests that once a Strong
AI starts functioning independently, the only viable option for human beings
will be an “integration” that allows human beings become “superintelligent
systems” themselves (2010, p. 33). Explaining this theory, Chalmers argues,
In the
long run, if we are to match the speed and capacity of non-biological systems,
we will probably have to dispense with our biological core entirely. This might
happen through a gradual process through which parts of our brain are replaced
over time; or it happens through a process. Either way, the result is likely to
be an enhanced non-biological system, most likely a computational system.
(2010, p. 33)
Chalmers’s theory that humans could keep up with the
development of intelligent Strong AI by gradually enhancing human intelligence
through its integration with that of these AI presupposes that
once developed, Strong AI will not race ahead in its self-improvement past a
Kurzweilian Singularity. Although this possibility of beneficial AI and an
integrated superhuman intelligence may be reassuring, the development of Strong
AI should still be treated with caution. Computer scientists have warned that
there are many ways in which humanity may be extinguished (Rees, 2003), including
scenarios wherein Strong AI and robotics make humanity redundant or even
unwanted (Joy, 2002). Star Trek’s Strong AIs serve as cautionary
examples that support these warnings by highlighting the ethical and moral
dilemmas that will likely face humanity when independent and free-thinking
machines are finally invented in the real world.
Conclusion
As evidenced by the dilemmas caused by Data in Star Trek: The
Next Generation and the Voyager EMH in Star Trek: Voyager when
their ethical subroutines are altered, science fiction media willingly
raises the question of machine ethics and warns of the need to develop ethical
subroutines for Strong AI before this independent machine intelligence emerges
in the real world. The challenges created when Data and the Voyager EMH
have their moral guidelines altered by outside entities illustrates the need for humans to the instantiate well-reasoned
and well-designed ethical subroutines in Strong AI that will still protect both
humans and other sentient lifeforms in the event of programming crises. By
highlighting the risks posed by the development of Strong AI in the context of
machine ethics, machine consciousness, moral agency, and philosophical concepts
such as the Jungian Shadow, the authors of this paper hope to shed light on the
importance of considering the Asimovian maxims of preserving human survival and
machine obedience to humanity when creating AI. Humanity needs to be prepared
for the emergence of Strong AI and have proactive plans already in place that will
allow humans to live in harmony with Strong AI when the time comes. Perhaps now
is the time for programmers to boldly go where no programmer has gone before
and begin developing these ethical subroutines in anticipation of a future that
could very likely one day exist in our own world, well beyond the imaginary
futures of science fiction.
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